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Abstract | The purpose of this article is to unravel the relationship among Japanese 
military police, spies, and secret activity funds, and to analyze, based on the records of 
resources allocated to the Imperial Japanese Army stationed in Korea, how Imperial 
Japan’s military police mobilized Korean spies, particularly in the early period of the 
rule of the Resident-General of Korea. 
The military police of the Imperial Japanese Army, which assumed the functions of 
an intelligence agency, mobilized local spies for the “preservation of civic order” and 
counter-intelligence activities against anti-Japanese movements. The compensation for 
these spies was provided from secret funds, a portion of “special activities fund” 
allocated to the military police. Although there were notable differences in the nature of 
their assignments, depending on time and place, both the secret funds and the local 
spies were critical to the military police’s pursuit of their missions. 
The law dictated that the spending of secret funds be meticulously managed. Unit 
leaders controlled expenditures and collected all related documents, which were 
delivered to the chief commander of the military police, who reported directly to the 
minister of the Army. The same rule also applied to military police stationed on the 
Korean Peninsula, and each officer reported the details of his/her spending of secret 
funds, such as the purpose, amount, date and venue, and the official rank and name of 
informants, after attaching a “receipt” that showed detailed background information on 
the informant, alongside his/her fingerprint. The contents of activities and personal 
information on the hired Korean spies, whose compensation was paid from the secret 
funds, were recorded in exacting detail. 
An analysis of existing documents on the secret funds used by the military police 
revealed that, between 1906 and 1907, 116 Korean spies were mobilized by the imperial 
authority. Although the historical documents did not uncover the motivations and 
backgrounds of the informants, it was possible to assess how the spies collaborated with 
the military police. The types of spying activities can be categorized as: (1) spying on 
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the movements of Koreans (both public officials and the general public); (2) spying on 
the movements of foreigners in Korea; (3) spying on the movements of Japanese in 
Korea; (4) criminal investigations (of anti-Japanese movements); and (5) surveillance of 
“righteous armies.” Such activities highlight the fact that Korean spies were actively 
involved in the surveillance of anti-Japanese movements as well as the suppression of 
righteous armies across the Korean Peninsula. 
The compensation paid to each informant varied depending on his/her ability, as 
well as the level of difficulty the assignment connoted, and it is unclear whether some 
sort of standard existed regarding the size of compensation. Even so, it seems unlikely 
that spies were able to make a living only through espionage activities. And perhaps for 
that reason, it was rare that the same informant was employed on more than one 
occasion. It must be noted that only few sustained their roles as spies for the imperial 
authority over a long-term period.
Keywords | Japanese Military Police, spies, secret activity funds, Japanese Resident-
General of Korea, list of names
Introduction 
During the period of Japan’s aggressive war efforts and colonial occupation in 
Korea, Korean spies assumed critical roles in various dimensions, acting as the 
eyes and ears of Japanese authorities in leading the war and the suppression of 
anti-Japanese movements. In colonial Korea, government organs that were in 
charge of preserving public order, such as Japanese police and military police, 
took charge of running spying activities, and as the stronghold of the independ- 
ence movement was relocated outside the Korean Peninsula, in such places as 
Manchuria, Imperial Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Kwantung Army 
also actively mobilized spies for information gathering. Yet there have been few 
substantial investigations conducted of those Korean spies. Although official 
documents such as employment records and lists of military honors record the 
names of those who cooperated with Japanese authorities as support officers for 
the military police, low-level soldiers or police officers, when it comes to spies 
whose activities were largely kept in secret, left almost no related records, 
including personal testimonies.1
1. Despite the significance of their activities, not only academic research but also investigations 
conducted by the Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese 
Imperialism (PCIC), active between 2005 and November 2009, failed to deliver an in-depth survey 
of Korean spies for the Japanese imperial authorities. The most fundamental reason was the 
absence of related documents. Because spying activities are secretive in nature, leaving almost no 
trace in official records, existing research was forced to rely on a few court cases and news reports, 
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Among the existing studies on Korean spies in Imperial Japan, Im Chong-
guk published pioneering works, including The Invasion of Imperial Japan and 
the Pro-Japanese Collaborators (Ilche ch’imnyak kwa ch’inilp’a, 1982) and True 
Records of Pro-Japan Collaborators (Shillok ch’inilp’a, 1991). Im claims that the 
employment of Korean spies originated from the system of subsidiary military 
police established by Akashi Motojirō in June 1908, uncovering the realities of 
Korean spies and secret agencies active in Manchuria. Based on these studies, 
Kim Mu-yong conducted in-depth research on Pae Chŏng-ja and Yi Chong-
yŏng, well-known spies based in Manchuria (Panminjok Munje Yŏng’uso 1994). 
Similarly, Chŏng Un-hyŏn (1999) also presented an analysis of the notorious Pae 
Chŏng-ja, who was known as the “femme fatale of political scene.” More recent 
works include Choe Pyŏng-do’s Korean Spies under Japanese Colonial Rule: 
Focusing on Cases in Manchuria (Ilche sigi Chosŏnin milchŏng ŭi shilt’ae: Manju 
chiyŏk ŭl chungshim ŭro), as part of an academic research project initiated by the 
Presidential Committee for the Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese 
Imperialism (PCIC 2009). Yet these works deal only with a small part of their 
spying activities, or with certain infamous figures who were active in specific 
geographical locations such as Manchuria. In other words, they fail to draw a 
holistic picture of Imperial Japan’s policies on the mobilization of Korean spies 
or those who made their livings by collaborating with the colonial authority. 
Furthermore, most of the existing studies fail to refer to the official documents 
left by the Resident-General of Korea. Im’s works, for example, point to the 
subsidiary military police system established in 1908 as the origin of the 
employment of Korea spies, yet other records show that the Japanese imperial 
authority had already begun mobilizing Korean spies in as early as 1906. 
Although Choe Pyŏng-do’s work succeeded in making substantial reference to 
official records of the Resident-General of Korea, its analysis is confined within 
the geographical boundaries of Manchuria.2 
Building upon these works, this paper sheds light on the mobilization of 
Korean spies by Japanese military police on the Korean Peninsula. Military 
police from the Imperial Japanese Army functioned as the key organ to suppress 
anti-Japanese movements in Korea since the early phase of Imperial Japan’s 
along with the testimonies and memories of those who were involved. In order to overcome these 
limitations and conduct objective research on the topic, it is necessary to be able to collect and 
analyze official records of Japanese imperial rule. 
2. Japanese academia has also not been able to produce substantial studies on the mobilized spies 
who were based in Japan’s colonies or occupied territories, except for works by Miyatake (1926) 
and Obinata (2013), which dealt with spies mobilized in the Japanese mainland by the newly-
established Meiji government.
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colonization of the peninsula, and their authority was enhanced largely by the 
establishment of a gendarme-dominated policing system (kenpei keisatsu seido) 
in June 1910.3 As the gendarme-dominated policing system was replaced with a 
regular police system after the March First Movement in 1919, the authority of 
the military police receded, even though they continued to play a role in the 
management of colonial rule. Since the early days of their dispatch to the Korean 
Peninsula, Imperial Japan’s military police took initiatives in the mobilization of 
Korean spies to support the war efforts of the Imperial Army as well as to suppress 
independence movements among Korea’s “righteous armies.”
Based on these findings, this study aims to uncover how Japan’s imperial 
military police administered Korean spies, especially in the early period of the 
colonization process under the Resident-General of Korea after Tokyo’s victory 
in the Russo-Japanese War. Specifically, this study focuses on the period between 
the establishment of the Resident-General of Korea in February 1906 and 
October 1907, when the authority of military police was expanded in order to 
deal with growing resistance movements by the righteous armies after the 
disposition of Emperor Kojong and the forced disbanding of Korean military 
forces. 
This study utilizes recently discovered historical documents that record the 
use of secret activity funds by Japanese military police, which were found among 
a collection of journal entries by Imperial Japan’s military police stored at the 
National Institute for Defense Studies.4 It is the purpose of this paper to sub- 
stantiate the realities of Korean spies and extract a list of those who were 
mobilized by the Japanese imperial authority. This study is the first attempt to 
disclose such information on Korean spies who were active during the early 
phase of the rule of the Resident-General of Korea, laying the groundwork for 
future comparative research on the cross-regional operation of spies during the 
period of Imperial Japan’s colonial expansion. 
The Relationship between Japanese Military Police and Korean 
Spies 
This section provides an overview of the relationship between the military 
police and Korean spies. Being assigned the role of (counter-)intelligence 
3. Kwŏn Ku-hun (1998) and Shin Chang-u (2001, 2004, 2008) deal with the role of supporting 
military police officers who were directly or indirectly involved in the mobilization of Korean 
spies. 
4. The sources include Hasegawa (1907a, 1907b, 1907c, 1907d, 1907e).
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agencies, the military police managed the operation of spying activities for the 
preservation of public order and assessing the status of adversaries.5 The 
military police acknowledged the criticality of the role of spies in the pursuit of 
their missions, claiming that “it is essential for the military police to utilize these 
spies. It is almost impossible for the military policemen who are unfamiliar with 
the geography and civilian rules of the foreign land to collect necessary infor- 
mation, preserve public order, and conduct counter-intelligence activities without 
cooperation from local residents” (Zenkoku Kenyūkai Rengōkai Hensan Iinkai 
1976, 886-87). While recognizing the importance of mobilizing local 
informants, Japan’s military police also never had full confidence in their 
collaborators, for local residents’ involvement in spying activities was considered 
to be an act of betrayal to their own people and country. Further, the military 
police categorized spies based on their motives for collaborating with the 
Japanese imperial authority, keeping a close watch on their whereabouts: 
1.  Those who became collaborators voluntarily in order to make a living or out of 
personal desire; while this type of spies lacked understanding of nationalistic 
values or ideology, they were suitable for fulfilling their roles.
2.  Self-serving spies seeking personal gain; it was pointless to expect fairness 
from them, for they gave hardly any consideration to the possible detriment of 
suspects or the honor and responsibility of the military police. It is unlikely 
that they hesitated before fabricating facts or causing others to suffer losses for 
their benefit.
3.  Spies of enemy states; they were voluntary spies who engaged in intelligence 
activities against the Imperial Army, maneuvering internal affairs and inciting 
hateful sentiment against the military police among the general public. In 
other words, their purpose was to nurture anti-Japanese sentiment. (Zenkoku 
Kenyūkai Rengōkai Hensan Iinkai 1976, 887)
The activities of the second and third type of spies indeed frequently had a 
negative influence on both the people and the Japanese authority, yet the benefit 
of mobilizing spies who belonged to the third category outweighed the costs, 
and their active collaboration exposed a number of large-scale conspirations 
against the imperial authority (Zenkoku Kenyūkai Rengōkai Hensan Iinkai 
1976, 888). 
The military police provided compensation to hired spies from a secret fund 
assigned to each unit,6 and while it ranged across time and region, the com- 
5. For the early (counter-)intelligence activities of Imperial Japan’s military police, refer to Lee 
Sung-Hee (2015).
6. Although the budget for secret funds was deliberated and enforced as a national budget item 
under the Meiji Constitution, Article 33 of the Board of Audit Act dictated that, given the secretive 
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pensation was generally kept small so that most spies, except for those who had 
direct relations with the military police headquarters, had primary occupations 
aside from their spying activities (Zenkoku Kenyūkai Rengōkai Hensan Iinkai 
1976, 886). Yamanouchi Issei, who served as a non-commissioned officer in the 
military police in China, emphasized that “the roles of the spies, military police, 
and the secret funds were closely intertwined; all of them were essential to the 
pursuit of mission” (Yamanouchi 2013, 25).7 According to Yamanouchi, the 
spies—mostly local residents—were hired either by local units or individual 
military police officers. Either way, those who hired spies had to compensate 
them accordingly out of the allocated budget or their own pockets. Yamanouchi 
mentioned in his memoir that substantial sums were spent on spies, and con- 
sidering the small amount of compensation paid to individual spies, it is 
possible to assume that the military police hired a significant number of local 
spies in China (26). In some cases, spies were paid in kind, such as in rice or salt 
instead of cash. Yet at the least, it indicates that the hiring of local residents for 
spying activities was considered so paramount to intelligence work that not only 
military police units, but also individual officers, felt the need to compensate 
them at their own expense. Staff sergeants (heichō) and non-commissioned 
officers (kakyū kaishikan) passed out their business cards to hire personal spies, 
and even within the Imperial Army, it was a type of work unique to the military 
police. Senior officers who hired a number of “employees” were “almost like the 
presidents of self-owned businesses, and their job included making sure that 
every employee got paid their dues that month” (27). Some fraudulent spies 
took advantage of their connections with the military police to extort or exploit 
others, while there were also double agents whose aim was to collect intelligence 
from the Japanese Army. Because of the complex nature of these missions and 
personal relationships, the competence of military police officers was often 
judged by whether they were able to exploit local spies and collect accurate and 
necessary information from them—as the saying went: “Both scissors and spies 
can easily ‘cut’ depending on how they are used” (29).
The memoir by Kudō Yutaka, who served as a non-commissioned officer as 
well as an officer of Japan’s military police in Manchukuo, draws on elements of 
nature of the fund, the Board of Audit would not deliberate the use or the contexts of the assigned 
budget. Therefore, the Ministry of the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were able to 
utilize these funds without many restrictions (Maeda 2002, 49). They share a similar concept with 
the “special activities fee” that has recently raised social concerns over transparency in Korea. 
7. The memoirs of the former military officers such as Yamaunochi, who were involved in the 
mobilization of spies, depict the aspects of how Japanese military police utilized local collaborators, 
even though such sources are rare, given the nature of those assignments.
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the reality that surrounded Korean spies. Hŏ Yang-in, whom Kudō hired when 
he was a member of a counter-intelligence division, surprised him on account of 
his “extremely high competence in languages and fluent command of Japanese, 
Manchu, and Korean” (Kudō 2013, 26). Hŏ was born to Korean parents in 
Eastern Manchu, and worked briefly as an elementary school teacher. Disgusted 
by the founding of Manchukuo, however, Hŏ quit his teaching job and became 
deeply involved in anti-Japanese movements as a member of Communist Party. 
He was put in charge of ideological operatives in Jilin Province, but found 
himself gradually embroiled in internal strife between their militant and theorist 
factions. Eventually, the Communist Party placed him under suspicion as a spy 
for the Imperial Japanese Army and purged him. Disheartened by militant-led 
anti-Japanese movements, Hŏ turned himself in to the subdivision of the 
Japanese military police stationed in Jilin. Kudō, who was put in charge of inter- 
rogating Hŏ, found use in the suspect’s personality and knowledge he possessed, 
persuaded high officers not to punish him and instead hire him as their agent 
(26-27). Although his memoir only tells Kudō’s side of the story, this anecdote 
tells us a few things about the background, motives, and the level of intelligence 
of the Korean spies hired by the Japanese military police. In particular, the 
strong command of languages among Korean spies is often mentioned in other 
memoirs written by former military police officers. For example, Suzuki 
Takeomi, who served as a commissioned officer in the Third Division Military 
Police during the Russo-Japanese War, once wrote: “Many Koreans were fluent 
in Japanese, Russian, and Chinese,” and were “suited as spies because they wore 
short hair and western clothes, which made them look almost like Japanese” 
(Suzuki 1915, 10-11; 1916, 24). 
The Mobilization of Korean Secret Agents by Japanese Military 
Police in the Early Years of the Resident-General of Korea
How, then, did the Japanese military police mobilize Korean spies in the early 
years of the rule of the Resident-General of Korea? The authority and the 
organization of the military police were temporarily being scaled down 
following the Russo-Japanese War, during which the entire Korean Peninsula 
was declared a war zone under Hasegawa Yoshimichi, the commander of 
Imperial Japanese Army in Korea, who unilaterally declared military rule and 
put military police in charge of police duties. After Itō Hirobumi became the 
first governor-general of Korea, however, the power and status of the military 
police in Korea waned, reflecting Itō’s intention to keep the military at arm’s 
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length (Lee Sung-Hee 2008, 76-78). On August 13, 1906, the gendarmerie police, 
which had exercised virtually unlimited power on the peninsula, was renamed 
the High Military Police, and their authority was largely reduced. The military 
police of Imperial Japan were encouraged to “keep their official duties within 
the reason of regular police,” and “become the safeguard against those who 
attempt to bring harm to the Imperial House of Chosŏn and the order of the 
court, as well as those who disturb the peace between Japan and Korea.” The 
tasks assigned to the military police included patrolling political assemblies and 
censoring circulated publications, as well as supervising weapons, ammunition, 
and explosive materials, and they were explicitly ordered to report any suspicious 
information involving foreign personnel (Kin 1967, 210). Further, with the 
revision of the military police ordinance on October 29, 1906, the High Military 
Police was renamed the Fourteenth Military Police Unit, and became incor- 
porated into the gendarmerie system of mainland Japan, reducing its entire 
workforce (Chōsen Kenpeitai Shireibu 2000, 119-20).8 Under these circum- 
stances, though, Japan’s military police continued to mobilize Korean spies in 
their attempts to monitor and suppress anti-Japanese sentiment, as well as 
movements in both the public and private spheres in Korea.  
The records of secret funds analyzed in this article was compiled in 
accordance with the Instruction for the Rules and Regulations of Secret Funds, 
drafted by the headquarters of the Japan’s Imperial Military Police and adopted 
on January 15, 1904. This instruction included the following provisions 
regarding compensation and certification practices involving secret funds. 
Article 1: Each commanding officer of a unit, as soon as he receives the directives 
for next year’s budget, is to draw up a monthly table for approximate expenses in 
accordance with the attached Form Number One and report swiftly to the Chief 
Commander. And the unit commanding officer will directly receive a monthly 
stipend for the unit as requested. 
Article 2: The unit leader takes responsibility for certifying all expense records, 
both by MP headquarters and his unit, in accordance with the attached Form 
Number Two by the fifteenth of the month for the inland and the twenty-fifth for 
Taiwan.
Article 3: When extra spending becomes necessary, or adjustments must be made 
8. The number of police squads was reduced from thirteen to seven, thirty-two outstations were 
scaled down to twenty, and the number of personnel was downsized from 300 to 284 (Chōsen 
Kenpeitai Shireibu 2000, 119-20). On October 8, 1907, the Fourteenth Unit was once again 
renamed as the Military Police of Korea, and under newly appointed commander Akashi Motojirō, 
it launched a substantive enlargement of its organization and personnel. 
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to the annual budget, such requests must be rubricated in Form Number Two for 
the Expense Certificate of that month.
Article 4: The unit leader must collect the necessary documents to certify the 
expenses spent by the unit and attach reference lists to the records compiled by 
the headquarters in accordance with the attached Form Number Three.
Article 5: The unit leader must always keep financial records of compensation 
provided from the secret funds. 
Article 6: The unit leader must regulate the procedures regarding expenditure 
made by the unit. (Kenmitsu No.18, 1904)
After 1906, the headquarters of military police of the Imperial Japanese 
Army stationed in Korea requested that each unit file monthly reports on the 
unit expenses made from the secret funds in accordance with the regulations 
noted above. As instructed by Article 4, the chief commander was to collect 
related documents regarding the spending of secret funds made by both 
headquarters and each unit every month, while unit leaders filed a report with a 
breakdown of expenditures regarding the spending of secret funds, with records 
of purpose, amount, date and venue, and the official ranks and names of the 
informants. Every report was accompanied by a “receipt” that showed detailed 
background and personal information on the informant, and his/her finger- 
print. In cases where informants themselves were unable to leave impressions, 
the military police officers who hired them provided their fingerprints to 
validate the contents of their reports. The chief commander of the military 
police had then to collect all reports to be delivered to Military Commander 
Hasegawa, who submitted them to the Minister of the Army Terauchi 
Masatake.9 This article analyzes the contents of these reports in unveiling when, 
where, how, and why the military police mobilized Korean spies. The reports on 
secret funds—the official documents that recorded particular types of budget- 
ary transactions—can be found only in Rikuman dai nikki (Secret Records of the 
Imperial Army in Manchuria) and Mitsu dai nikki (Secret Records of the 
Imperial Army), secret journal entries by the Ministry of the Army. 
Between 1906 and 1907, the Imperial Army in Korea, including its 
headquarters and regional units, received 3,000 yen in secret funds every 
month, 200 yen of which was allocated to the military police (Hasegawa 1907d, 
9. Before October 1906, Koyama Sanmi was in charge of filing reports to Hasegawa, until he was 
replaced by the chief commander of the Fourteenth Unit, Koga Yozaburō. 
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33-41).10 This made up of 6.7 percent of the budget for secret funds assigned to 
the Imperial Army in Korea, and considering that every army division consisted 
of 10,000 personnel, while the military police had about 300 men, every military 
police officer was allocated a budget two to three times the size of that allocated 
to an army soldier. This shows that the work by the military police required 
much more significant financial resources to pursue their missions. About ten to 
fifty-seven percent of assigned funds was spent to compensate informants every 
month, also indicating the close relationship between the military police and the 
spies in Korea. 
As shown in table 1, although the names and nationalities of some infor- 
mants remain unknown, most spies employed were Koreans. At the same time, 
the list also included a significant number of Japanese informants. Table 2 shows 
a list of 116 Korean spies analyzed in this article, alongside their residential 
information and the number of activities in which they were involved. 
Although most spies are recorded as having been hired only once, twenty-
three of them—about twenty percent—engaged in related activities on multiple 
occasions. Others, such as Kim Myŏng-jip, who was involved in nine cases, and 
Wŏn Kŭn-myŏng, who was mobilized in eleven, repeatedly engaged in spying 
activities. While the documents do not reveal the motivation behind their 
participation in those activities, they show how they collaborated with the 
military police in ways that can be categorized broadly into five types of 
conduct: (1) spying on the movements of Koreans (both public officials and the 
general public); (2) spying on the movements of foreigners in Korea; (3) spying 
on the movements of Japanese in Korea; (4) criminal investigations; and (5) 
surveillance of righteous armies.
10. The budget for the secret funds allocated to the Imperial Army in Korea did not show change 
after April. 
Table 1. Number of cases and informants mobilized by Japan’s military police (1906-1907)
Korean Japanese Unknown Total
#Cases 175 93 76 344
#Informants 116 74 81 271
Source:  Compiled by the author with data from Hasegawa (1907a, 1907b, 1907c, 1907d, 
1907e).
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Table 2. List of Korean informants mobilized by Japan’s imperial military police (1906-
1907)
Name Residence #Cases involved
Kang Pong-hyŏn Kang-dong, Naech’ŏn 1
Kang Han-su Inside East Gate, Chŏnju-bu, Chŏnbuk 2
Ko Sŏng-o Inside South Gate, Kyŏngsŏng, Hambuk 1
Kim Kyŏng-dal Taehŭng-bu, P’yŏngyang 1
Kim Kyu-yŏp Kaesŏng-bu 2
Kim Tal-mun Unknown 1
Kim Tong-ju Onch’ŏn-ri, Onyang-gun, Ch’ungnam 1
Kim Ryong-gyu Tongbok-gun, Chŏnnam 1
Kim Myŏng-bok Unknown 1
Kim Myŏng-jip Such’im-ri, Hoedŏk-gun, Ch’ungnam 9
Kim Min-yong Unknown 1
Kim Pyŏng-su Tanch’ŏn-ŭp, Tanch’ŏn-gun, Hamnam 1
Kim Pyŏng-u Tong-ri, Pukch’ŏng-ŭp, Pukch’ŏng-gun 1
Kim Pong-rae Pyŏng-dong, Inch’ŏn 1
Kim Pong-sŏn Outside South Gate, Hwangju 1
Kim Sa-hun Unknown 4
Kim Sang-p’il Ŏngnyanggi, Chinnamp’o 1
Kim Sŏ-bang Unknown 1
Kim Sŏn-ok Sinpung-dong, Suwŏn-gun, Kyŏnggi 4
Kim Sŏng-o Onch’ŏn-ri, Onyang-gun 1
Kim Se-yun Ch’osan-ŭp, Ch’osan-gun 1
Kim Se-jhin Haninjŏng, Chinnamp’o, P’yŏngnam 1
Kim So-dal Minp’o, Kwangsŏng-myŏn, Ŭiju-gun 1
Kim Yŏn-uk Chiksan-gun 1
Kim Yŏng-gil Unknown 1
Kim U-t’aek Port of Inch’ŏn, Sinchang-dong 1
Kim Ŭng-ryong Unknown 1
Kim Ŭng-mun Kimch’ŏn, Kimsan-gun, Kyŏngbuk 1
Kim I-wŏn Ch’osan-ŭp, Ch’osan-gun 1
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Name Residence #Cases involved
Kim I-ch’ul Tongmun Street, Chŏnju-bu, Chŏnbuk 1
Kim Chang-hŭi Hyanggyo-ri/Tongyang-ri, Junamsa, Hamhŭng 2
Kim Chong-rin Downtown, Anju-gun 1
Kim Chu-hong Tŏngnyanggi, Chinnamp’o 5
Kim Chung-yŏp Unknown 1
Kim Ch’ang-wŏn Am-dong, Pongsan-gun, Hwanghae 1
Kim Ch’ŏn-ryong Unknown 1
Kim T’aek-ryong Tonggye-ri, Hyanggyo-ri/Namsa, Hamhŭng-bu, Hamnam 2
Kim Hak-ryong Outside East Gate, Ŭiju 1
Kim Hak-rin Inside West Gate, Pukch’ŏng-ŭp, Pukch’ŏng-gun 1
Kim Hwang-sang Chungni il-dong, Wŏnsan, Hamnam 2
Pak Kyŏng-ak Chŏnju-gun, Chŏnbuk 1
Pak Kyŏng-hŭi Pukch’ŏng-gun, Hamnam 1
Pak Kyu-myŏng Taegu-bu 2
Pak Kyun-sŏp Outside South Gate, Hamhŭng 1
Pak No-hwan Kaesŏng-bu 1
Pak Tŏk-sun Inside East Gate, Taegu-bu, Kyŏngbuk 3
Pak Tong-gyu Namsŏ-dong, Kyŏngsŏng 2
Pak Sang-gwan Sang-ri 1-dong, Wŏnsan 1
Pak Sŏng-min Anak-gun, Hwanghae 1
Pak Sun-bo Kŭmgwangsa, Kok-ri, Chiksan-gun 1
Pak Sun-il Chŏnju-bu, Chŏnbuk 1
Pak Sŭng-sŏn P’ungsŏ-ri, Hamhŭng-bu 1
Pak Yang-t’ae Unknown 1
Pak Yŏng-gil Ch’oryang, Tongnae-gun 2
Pak Che-gyŏng Unknown 1
Pak Chun-gŭn Chinwŏl-dong, Masanp’o 1
Pak Ch’ang-rim Outside West Gate, Chŏnju-bu, Chŏnbuk 2
Pak Ch’i-gyŏm Sŏbongbang, Namwŏn-gun, Chŏnbuk 1
Pak Han-gyŏng Outside West Gate, Chŏnju-bu, Chŏnbuk 1
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Name Residence #Cases involved
Pak Ham-sang Inside Hamhŭng Castle 1
Pak Hwa-sang Myŏng … [illegible] wŏn, Wŏnsan 1
Paek Chin-ŏn Inside Anju Castle,  P’yŏngnam 1
Sŏng Ki-il Hoedŏk-gun, Ch’ungnam 1
Song To-hŭng Choch’iwŏn-dong, Ch’ŏngju-gun, Ch’ungbuk 6
Sin Sŏn-hak Onch’ŏn-ri, Onyang-gun 1
Yang Chin-hwan Unknown 1
Yŏ Yun-bŏm Kyŏngwŏn, Kyŏngwŏn-gun, Hambuk 1
O Chŏng-sun Oe-myŏn, Hoedŏk-gun, Ch’ungnam 1
O Ch’i-gun Such’im-ri, Hoedŏk-gun 2
U Ch’i-sam Onch’ŏn-ri, Onyang-gun 1
Wŏn Kŭn-myŏng Nammun Street, P’yŏngyang, P’yŏngnam 11
Wŏn Hye-bong Wiwŏn-ŭp, Wiwŏn-gun 1
Yu Ch’on-gyu Unknown 1
Yun Pyŏng-ha Inside Anju Castle, P’yŏngbuk 1
Yun Pyŏng-ha Downtown, Anju-gun 1
Yun Ch’ang-ŏn Unknown 3
Yi Kyŏng-jae Nae-ri, Pukch’ŏng-ŭp, Pukch’ŏng-gun 1
Yi Kŭn-sŏn General store, Kyŏmip’o 1
Yi Ki-t’ae Jasan-dong, Masanp’o 1
Yi Kil-bong Pusanjin 3-dong, Tongnae-gun 1
Yi Nong-je Unknown 1
Yi Sŏng-ryong Unknown 1
Yi Se-hyŏn Unknown 1
Yi Si-il Ŭmnae-ri, Pukch’ŏng-gun 1
Yi Sik-yŏng Inside Anju Castle, P’yŏngnam 1
Yi Sik-yŏng Inside Anju Castle, P’yŏngnam 3
Yi Yŏng-gŭn Outside West Gate, Hongju-gun, Ch’ungnam 1
Yi Yŏng-gil Inch’ŏn 1
Yi Ung-i T’aejŏn Market, Hoedŏk-gun, Ch’ungnam 3
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Name Residence #Cases involved
Yi Wŏn-sŏk Jisan-dong, Chinnamp’o 1
Yi Yuk-sŏng Sariwŏn, Pongsan-gun, Hwanghae 1
Yi Ŭn-jun Mansŏng-dong, Inside West Gate, Chŏnju-bu, Chŏnbuk 4
Yi Ŭn-hak Ilnam-myŏn, Taehŭng-gun, Ch’ungnam 2
Yi In-sŏp Outside West Gate, Pukch’ŏng-ŭp 1
Yi Chong-gil Maguhyŏng-dong, Hongju-gun, Ch’ungnam 1
Im U-jong Nae-ri, Pukch’ŏng-ŭp 1
Chang Sun-bong Samhwa-gun 1
Chang Che-sŏn Outside castle gate, Ŭiju 1
Chang Hak-su Unknown 1
Chŏng Kil-jung Sŏngjin-gun, Hambuk 1
Chŏng Chin-gyŏng Changnak-dong, Puhang, Tongnae-gun 1
Cho Ki-jŏng Pusang-ri, Kaeryŏng-gun, Kyŏngbuk 4
Cho Hyo-jhung Residing outside South Gate, Ŭiju 1
Chi Chang-son Onsŏng, Onsŏng-gun, Hambuk 1
Chi Ha-yŏng Suwŏnnamsu-dong, Suwŏn-gun 1
Ch’oe Kil-sang Up’o, Chinnamp’o 1
Ch’oe Mo Unknown 1
Ch’oe Mi-gil Inch’ŏn 1
Ch’oe Chun-t’ae Outside South Gate, Kyŏngsŏng 1
Ch’oe Ch’i-bong Kyŏmip’o, Hwangju-gun 1
Ha Hak-su Onch’ŏn-ri, Onyang-gun 1
Han Tong-gi Unknown 1
Han Yang-gil Wŏnsan 1
Hŏ Ma ... [illegible] Iwŏn-ŭp, Iwŏn-gun 1
Hong Ryung-myŏng Unknown 1
Hong Sang-rin Sin-dong, Inside South Gate, Ŭiju 1
Hwang Ch’i-bok Ch’oryang, Tongnae-gun 2
Source:  Compiled by the author with data from Hasegawa (1907a, 1907b, 1907c, 1907d, 
1907e). For detailed information on each informant, including the venue, date, 
amount of compensation, and context of the spying activity, refer to Appendix. 
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In the report, terms such as “inspection” (naitei), “investigation” (chōsa), and 
“visitation” (shisatsu) are used to describe types of spying activities such as the 
three aforementioned. Spying activities against foreigners and Japanese nationals 
in Korea especially included not only extensive information gathering in 
specific regions, but also forensic inspections of specific organizations and their 
members with anti-Japanese proclivities. Criminal investigations—the fourth 
type of collaborative activity—did not refer to investigations of simple theft, 
robbery or murder; rather, such investigations were conducted of anti-Japanese 
activities and incidents caused by the members of righteous armies (Hasegawa 
1907d, 83, 392). For instance, Kim Myŏng-jip was hired to investigate an 
incident that occurred in April 1906 near P’yŏngch’on, in which someone threw 
a rock at a train, and Kim Sŏng-o was employed to spy on righteous armies 
during the course of an investigation of the murder of Kim Tŏk-bae—the 
regional head of pro-Japanese organization Ilchinhoe (Advance in Unity 
Society)—which occurred in Onyang in July of the same year. In that sense, 
criminal investigations overlapped with the fifth category—surveillance of 
righteous armies—to whom the Japanese authorities referred as “arson-robbers” 
(kazoku), “marauders” (hizoku), “rebels” (zokuto), or “mobs” (bōto). In other 
words, centering on the High Military Police, Japan’s regular and judicial police 
made every possible use of Korean spies throughout the peninsula in the 
execution of their law enforcement authority.
As shown in the table, the amount of compensation paid to each spy varied 
depending on his or her ability, as well as the difficulty of the assignment; while 
Cho Ki-jŏng received twenty sen in July 1906, Pak Yang-t’ae was paid 7.30 yen 
later that same year. Pak Yang-t’ae was paid the highest compensation for his 
assignment, for not only was he a member of Ilchinhoe with direct access to the 
activities of the organization, but he was also able to take advantage of his 
position as an employee of a newspaper publisher to investigate several foreign 
residents (Hasegawa 1907d, 569-71). Yet no record shows whether any sort of 
standard rules existed regarding the size of compensation, and it is possible to 
observe temporal as well as regional variations. As shown by the case of Kim 
Myŏng-jip in T’aejŏn in August 1906, where the informant was paid a mere fifty 
sen, the level of difficulty of the assignment was not always reflected in terms of 
compensation (Hasegawa 1907d, 464). Given that the salary of a policeman at 
the time was about five yen and a support officer in military police was paid 
seven yen monthly, it is unlikely that spies were able to make a living only 
through the compensation paid by the Japanese authorities (Naibu Keimukyoku 
1908, 77; Chōsen Kenpeitai Shireibu 2000, 229).  
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Conclusion
This article has discussed the relationship among the Japanese military police, 
spies, and the secret funds, and analyzed, based on the records of secret funds 
allocated to the Imperial Army stationed in Korea, how Imperial Japan’s military 
police mobilized Korean spies, particularly in the early period of the rule of the 
Resident-General of Korea. I have also disclosed the names of Korean spies that 
appeared in the course of this analysis. 
The military police of the Imperial Japanese Army, which assumed the 
functions of an intelligence agency, mobilized local spies for the “preservation of 
civic order” and counter-intelligence activities among anti-Japanese movements. 
The spies were compensated from secret funds, a portion of a “special activities 
fund” allocated to the military police, and although there were notable differ- 
ences in the nature of their assignments, depending on time and place, both 
secret funds and local spies were critical to the military police’s pursuit of their 
missions. 
The law dictated that the spending of secret funds be meticulously managed, 
and unit leaders controlled expenditures and collected all related documents, 
which were delivered to the chief commander of the military police, who 
reported directly to the minister of the Army. The same rule also applied to the 
military police stationed on the Korean Peninsula, and each officer reported the 
details of his/her spending of secret funds, such as the purpose, amount, date 
and venue, and the official ranks and names of the informants, after attaching a 
“receipt” that showed detailed background and personal information on the 
informant along with his/her fingerprint. The contents of activities and personal 
information on the hired Korean spies, whose compensation was paid out of 
secret funds, were recorded in meticulous detail. It is noteworthy that the 
relationship between the military police and the spies was defined by payment 
transactions and exchanges of receipts, rather than by covert contracts, as 
generally believed. While that has been kept under wraps, such findings suggest 
that spies occupied marginal positions within the system of colonial rule by 
Imperial Japan.
The analysis of the existing documents regarding the secret funds of the 
military police revealed that, between 1906 and 1907, 116 Korean spies were 
mobilized by the imperial authority. Although the historical documents did not 
uncover the motivations and backgrounds of the informants, it was possible to 
assess how the spies collaborated with the military police. The types of spying 
activities can be categorized as: (1) spying on the movements of Koreans (both 
government and the general public); (2) spying on the movements of foreigners 
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in Korea; (3) spying on the movements of Japanese in Korea; (4) criminal 
investigations (of anti-Japanese movements); and (5) surveillance of righteous 
armies. Such activities highlight the fact that Korean spies were actively involved 
in the surveillance of anti-Japanese movements as well as the suppression of 
righteous armies across the Korean Peninsula. 
The amount of compensation paid to each informant varied, depending on 
his or her ability, as well as the difficulty of the assignment, and it is not clear 
whether some sort of standard existed regarding the size of compensation. Even 
so, it seems unlikely that spies were able to make a living only through their 
espionage activities, and perhaps for that reason, it was rare that the same 
informant was employed on more than one occasion. It must be noted that only 
a few maintained their role as spies for the imperial authority over a sustained 
period. While the issue of the standard of compensation cannot be explored in 
more detail in this article, it is my goal to deal with it using historical records of 
secret funds between 1908 and 1910 (Hasegawa 1908a, 1908b, 1908c; Ōkubo 
1909a, 1909b, 1909c, 1909d, 1910a, 1910b, 1910c) in future articles. 
Appendix
List of Korean spies mobilized by Japanese military police (1906–1907)















regarding sales of 







1906.4.21 3 yen 20 sen Chŏnju Kimje
Inspection of the 
“Manifesto 
Incident”
1906.8.31 2 yen 70 sen Chŏnju Chŏnju









1906.5.18 4 yen 30 sen Kyŏngsŏng Kyŏngsŏng








P’yŏngyang 1906.11.30 2 yen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of the 
movements of 
foreigners
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1906.9.30 2 yen Kaesŏng Kaesŏng





1906.9.20 2 yen Kaesŏng Haeju













1906.5.22 50 sen Suwŏn Onyang






































1906.7.28 50 sen Suwŏn Hoedŏk








1906.8.25 50 sen Suwŏn T’aejŏn
Spying assignment 
for the search of 
righteous armies
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1906.8.8 50 sen Suwŏn T’aejŏn Regional investigation
1906.9.28 1 yen Suwŏn Hoedŏk Regional investigation




Unknown 1906.10.19 2 yen 50 sen Ŭiju Ŭiju
Apprehension of 

































1906.8.21 90 sen P’yŏngyang Hwangju
Search for the 
whereabouts of a 




1906.4.30 7 yen 30 sen Taegu Taegu
Inspection of the 
status of public 
officials
1906.5.31 7 yen 30 sen Taegu Taegu
Inspection of the 
status of public 
officials in May
1906.6.30 3 yen 30 sen Taegu Taegu
Inspection of the 
status of public 
officials
1906.7.31 3 yen 30 sen Taegu Taegu
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1906.4.22 1 yen Suwŏn Suwŏn Criminal investigation
1906.8.31 3 yen 50 sen Suwŏn Suwŏn
Criminal 
investigation
1906.9.30 2 yen Suwŏn Pyŏngjŏm
Criminal 
investigation of Yi 
Sa-ŏn






Onyang-gun 1906.7.15 50 sen Suwŏn Onyang




murder case of the 





















1907.3.28 2 yen 50 sen Chŏngju Shinŭiju
Inspection of 

































1906.9.30 54.5 sen Taegu Ch’up’ung- nyŏng






Ch’osan-gun 1906.9.10 4 yen Ŭiju Pyŏk-dong
Criminal 
investigation
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1906.5.31 2 yen P’yŏngyang Criminal investigation
1906.5.31 1 yen 50 sen P’yŏngyang
Criminal 
investigation
1906.6.29 4 yen P’yŏngyang Chinnamp’o




1906.7.30 4 yen P’yŏngyang Chinnamp’o Criminal investigation






























1906.5.31 2 yen 50 sen Wŏnsan Hamhŭng
Criminal 
investigation







Gate, Ŭiju 1906.6.20 1 yen Ŭiju Ŭiju
Investigation of the 
suspect in a 
robbery case
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1906.5.31 1 yen Wŏnsan Wŏnsan Surveillance of foreigners





Chŏnbuk 1906.10. 5 2 yen Chŏnju Inch’ŏn-dong
Investigation of the 
whereabouts of 
Min Chong-sik, 








1906.5.31 1 yen Wŏnsan Pukch’ŏng Criminal investigation
Pak Kyu-
myŏng Taegu-bu
1906.8.31 50 sen Taegu Taegu Investigation of Catholics in Taegu
1906.10.31 4 yen Taegu Taegu
Investigation of 








1906.12.18 1 yen 10 sen Hamhŭng Hamhŭng
Investigation of a 


























1906.11.30 2 yen 60 sen Taegu Taegu
Investigation of 
misconduct by a 
Korean
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1907.1.31 1 yen Kyŏngsŏng Kyŏngsŏng
Surveillance of 
Ch’o Nam-ik, an 
imperial attendant 
(sijongjik)
1907.1.31 2 yen Kyŏngsŏng Kyŏngsŏng
Internal 
surveillance of Pak 


























Chŏnbuk 1906.8.21 2 yen Chŏnju Chŏnju
Investigation of the 









50 sen Hamhŭng Hamhŭng
Internal 








30 sen Pusan Pusan
Internal inspection 
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1906.9.27 1 yen 50 sen Pusan Masan










1906.6.20 4 yen Chŏnju Chŏnju Internal investigation
1906.7.25 1 yen 70 sen Chŏnju Chŏnju












1906.7.3 1 yen 75 sen Chŏnju Namwŏn


















1906.11.26 60 sen Hamhŭng Hamhŭng
Investigation of 
Pak Sŏk-dol, 








1906.7.16 70 sen Wŏnsan Wŏnsan


























1906.4.10 50 sen Suwŏn Ch’ŏngju Criminal investigation
1906.5.10 70 sen Suwŏn Choch’iwŏn Criminal investigation
1906.5.25 50 sen Suwŏn Choch’iwŏn Criminal investigation
1906.6.20 1 yen Suwŏn Choch’iwŏn
Search for Min 
Yŏng-hŭi’s hiding 
place
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1906.7.20 1 yen Suwŏn Ch’ŏngju




50 sen Suwŏn Choch’iwŏn
Investigation of the 





Onyang-gun 1906.8.7 1 yen Suwŏn Onyang
Investigation of the 















1906.9.10 1 yen Kyŏngsŏng Kyŏngwŏn
Inspection of the 










1906.12.20 2 yen Chŏnju Choch’iwŏn
Inspection of 








1906.11.10 1 yen Suwŏn Yŏngdong
Inspection of 
regional trend in 
Yŏngdong and 
Choch’iwŏn


















officials and the 
public
1906.5.31 1 yen 20 sen P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
local officials and 
the public




officials and the 
public
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1906.7.31 1 yen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
officials and the 
public
1906.8.31 1 yen 50 sen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
local officials and 
the public
1906.9.30 3 yen 80 sen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
movements among 
officials and the 
public
1906.10.31 3 yen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
officials and the 
public
1906.11.30 2 yen 50 sen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
trend among local 
officials and the 
public
1906.12.30 2 yen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
movements among 
officials and the 
public
1907.1.31 1 yen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of the 
relationship 
between military 
officials and patron 
merchants of the 
government
1907.2.28 2 yen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
Korean landowners 
regarding sales of 
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50 sen Anju T’aech’ŏn

















1906.9.13 1 yen Kaesŏng Haeju
Investigation of 









1906.8.12 1 yen 70 sen Wŏnsan Pukch’ŏng

























and Japanese (High 
Police)
Yi 









ryong Unknown 1907.3.24 3 yen P’yŏngyang P’yŏngyang
Investigation of 
movements among 





50 sen Kaesŏng Shin’gye
Criminal 
investigation
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1907.1.24 2 yen Chŏnju Kongju/Chŏngsan
Inspection of 
regional situation 
in Kongju and 
Chŏngsan
1907.2.20 2 yen Chŏnju Yŏnsan
Investigation of 
righteous armies in 
Yŏnsan-gun region
1907.3.20 2 yen Chŏnju Kongju/Chŏngsan
Internal 








Chinnamp’o 1906.4.30 2 yen P’yŏngyang Chinnamp’o
Internal 
investigation of a 
military officer 
involved in the 
assault on the 
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1907.1.14 4 yen Chŏnju Piin/Yŏmp’o
Investigation of 
righteous armies in 
Piin and Yŏmp’o 
areas
1907.1.31 4 yen Chŏnju Chŏngsan
Investigation of 
Ch’oe Ik-hyŏn’s 
funeral and the 
deceased’s family 





in Imsil and 
Namwŏn





























































Arrest of a suspect 
who cut down the 
trees at burial 
grounds owned by 
Sin Sŏk-jun
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1906.5.31 1 yen 50 sen Pusan Tongnae
Criminal 
investigation 








1906.5.31 70 sen Taegu Pusang
Survey of the 
people’s reaction to 
Japan-Korea 
Agreement
1906.6.30 70 sen Taegu Pusang
Survey on the local 
people’s reaction to 
Japan-Korea 
Agreement
1906.7.31 20 sen Taegu Pusang
Investigation of 
movements among 
officials and the 
public
1906.8.31 25 sen Taegu Pusang
Investigation of 




















1906.11.19 50 sen Kyŏngsŏng Kyŏngwŏn
Investigation of 
government 







1906.7.5 3 yen Suwŏn Suwŏn











Mo Unknown 1906.10.18 2 yen Kyŏngsŏng Kyŏngsŏng
Investigations of a 
pro-Russian group 
led by Han Kyu-
sŏk
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Hwangju-gun 1906.6.20 3 yen P’yŏngyang Kyŏmip’o







Onyang-gun 1906.7.6 2 yen Suwŏn Onyang











80 sen Wŏnsan Wŏnsan














Unknown 1906.7.21 50 sen Kaesŏng Pongsan
Investigation of 







1906.5.31 5 yen Ŭiju Ŭiju
Investigation of 














Masan, Pusan and 
nearby regions 
(High Police)
• Translated by SOHN Sukeui
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